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From Blackstone to Holmes: The
Revolt Against Natural Law
Albert W. Alschuler*
A number of fortuitous circumstances made William Blackstone the
principal teacher of law to American lawyers of the revolutionary generation
and the early republic.' Daniel Boorstin said of Blackstone's
Commentaries, "In the history of American institutions, no other book-
except the Bible-has played so great a role."2  Yet Blackstone's
jurisprudence is widely regarded today as ponderous, formal, conceptual,
deductive, mechanistic, naive, and hopelessly unrealistic. A revolt against
formalism led by Oliver Wendell Holmes is said to have given us a better,
more flexible, more adaptive concept of law.
Liva Baker, one of Holmes's biographers, voiced the conventional
understanding:
American legal scholarship... was ripe for the kind of corrective
surgery Holmes was about to perform. The traditions of the natural
law-the law of nature transmitted by divine will-as explicated by
Blackstone... its roots running deep into the soil of ancient Greece
and Rome, had outlived its usefulness. Its immutable principles
comforted. Its abstract and logical nature satisfied. Its simplicity,
certainty, and reasonableness continued to be appealing. But its
inertia kept it from dealing with the disorder and changefulness and
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and
Criminology Emeritus, the University of Chicago. This article is an edited version of my remarks to
the symposium "Is There a Higher Law? Does It Matter?" at the Pepperdine University School of
Law on February 21, 2008. It is drawn primarily from two of my earlier publications: Rediscovering
Blackstone, see infra note 1, and Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice
Holmes, see infra note 42.
1. See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-19 (1996).
2. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, Preface to THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES SHOWING HOW BLACKSTONE, EMPLOYING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
IDEAS OF SCIENCE, RELIGION, HISTORY, AESTHETICS, AND PHILOSOPHY, MADE OF THE LAW AT
ONCE A CONSERVATIVE AND A MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE (Beacon 1958). Boorstin commented, "In the
first century of American independence, the Commentaries were not merely an approach to the study
of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law." Id. at 3.
all the other complexities of nineteenth-century life. The
traditionalists "discovered" law which was deduced from the
unchanging nature of things.... That the law's development might
have been progressive was not generally recognized.
A few pages later, Baker offered this serenade to Holmes's
achievement:
[Holmes] had broken new intellectual trails, using history to guide
him. He had given the law a vitality it never before had possessed.
He had wrested legal history from the aridity of syllogism and
abstraction and placed it in the context of human experience,
demonstrating that the corpus of the law was neither ukase from
God nor derived from Nature, but.., a constantly evolving thing, a
response to the continually developing social and economic
environment.4
The goal of this brief article is to persuade you that this conventional
wisdom is backwards-or, to put the matter less delicately, that the twentieth
century and the twenty-first century so far have been a mistake.
I begin with Blackstone's concept of natural law. He wrote in the age of
Newton and compared the laws governing human conduct to the laws of
motion:
[A]s God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of
mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that
motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to
conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable
laws of human nature... and gave him also the faculty of reason to
discover the purport of those laws....
... These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and
evil .... Such among others are these principles: that we should live
honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his
due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the
whole doctrine of law. 5
492
3. LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 249 (1991).
4. Id. at 258.
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *39-40.
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Since at least the thirteenth century, people have complained that the
term natural law has too many meanings.6 The term sometimes is used to
refer to the objectivism about morality associated with most religious faiths.
Natural law comes from God; it comes from the top down. A second
meaning treats moral truths as truths about human nature. Natural law
proceeds from the bottom up. Rather than choose between these uses,
Blackstone endorsed both. He maintained that the study of God and the
study of human nature led to the same understanding.
Natural law came from God, and God, "a being of infinite power,"
might "have prescribed [for humanity] whatever laws he pleased," however
"unjust or severe."7  As "a being of infinite wisdom," however, God had
"inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of
each individual."8 Happiness could be attained only by observing the law of
nature, and obedience to this law could not fail to produce human
happiness.9 You can discover natural law by reading your Bible, 10 but you
can also figure it out by asking whether an action tends to man's real
happiness or is destructive of man's real happiness."
Did this mean that judges could deduce answers to all or most legal
questions from natural law? No one has ever said that they could, and
Blackstone was emphatic on the point. Most positive law concerned the
"great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the
natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the
benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits."' 2 As Blackstone
6. See DOM ODON LOTTIN, LE DROIT NATUREL CHEZ SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN ET SES
PRtDtCESSEURS 23 (2d ed. 1931) (quoting JEAN LE TEUTONIQUE, GLOSSA ORDINARIA D.I.c.7
(1215)).
7. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *40 (emphasis omitted).
8. Id. (emphasis omitted).
9. Id.
10. Blackstone observed that if human reason were always clear and perfect, the criterion of
"real happiness" would be a sufficient guide to the laws of nature. Id. at *41. "[l]n compassion to
the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason," however, providence had
supplemented reason with "an immediate and direct revelation" of divine law in scripture. Id. at
*41-42.
11. Emphasizing the close "connection of justice and human felicity," Blackstone declared that
the
[Creator] has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and
precepts . . . as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of
obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own happiness." This
is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.
Id. at *40-41.
12. Id. at *42.
observed, God was not concerned with whether English law forbade or
permitted the export of wool. 3 Blackstone wrote that "things in themselves
indifferent.., become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or
misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper, for
promoting the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the
purposes of civil life." 14
Here is an illustration of the limited scope that Blackstone accorded
natural law:
[O]ur own common law has declared, that the goods of the
wife do instantly upon marriage become the property and
right of the husband... yet that right... ha[s] no foundation
in nature; but [is] merely created by the law, for the
purposes of civil society.' 5
Defenders of patriarchal institutions are likely to see them as grounded on
fundamental differences between the sexes, 16 but Blackstone declined to
characterize a husband's power over his wife's goods as anything more than
a convenient, pragmatic, alterable legal arrangement-an arrangement
having "no foundation in nature.""'
Similarly, Blackstone wrote that people might "conceive at first view"
that the natural right to property included a right to inherited property.' 8 He
insisted, however, that all inheritance rules were "creatures of the civil or
municipal laws."' 9 Laws allowing bequests of property might be "wise and
effectual," but there was "certainly... no injustice done to individuals,
whatever be the path of descent marked out by the municipal law."2 °
Blackstone noted the tendency to "mistake for nature what we find
established by long and inveterate custom." 2 1
If you cannot deduce answers to difficult legal questions from natural
law, what good is it? Rather than deduce things from natural law, you can
obey it. When lawgivers do obey it, the laws they issue can foster a sense of
security, mutual concern, and reciprocity. These laws can promote the real
13. Id. at *43.
14. Id. at *55.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (declaring that admitting women to the bar
would be not only a "[departure] from the order of nature" but "treason against it").
17. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *55.
18. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at * 11.
19. Id. at * 12.
20. Id. at *211.
21. Id. at *11.
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happiness of humankind. Blackstone claimed no greater role for natural law
than that.
The claim that Blackstone saw law as static and unchanging-
something that judges found and never made-is a calumny. Blackstone
wrote that "the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans"
had all contributed to the development of the English common law, "thereby
in all probability improving the texture and wisdom of the whole by the
accumulated wisdom of diverse particular countries., 22 He titled his final
chapter, "Of the Rise, Progress, and Gradual Improvements, of the Laws of
England.' , 23  He complained that the defects of English law were often
attributable to "too scrupulous an adherence to some rules of the antient
common law, when the reasons have ceased upon which those rules were
founded., 24  He urged many law reforms-including the creation of a
system for recording wills and deeds,25 expansion of the right to counsel,26
restriction of the death penalty,27 abolition of the doctrine that the bloodline
of a felon is corrupted,28 and the reform of England's game laws,29
inheritance laws,3 ° and poor laws.31
Oliver Wendell Holmes added nothing new to law when he proclaimed,
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
32
Blackstone and writers before him 33 certainly understood that changing
human experience shaped law. Moreover, the evolutionary character of law
was a point of pride for Americans from the beginning. The words of John
Dickinson to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 look like a paraphrase
of Holmes, but they anticipated Holmes by a century: "Experience must be
our only guide. Reason may mislead us."' 34  James Madison similarly
22. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *64.
23. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *400-43.
24. Id. at *3.
25. Id. at *342-43.
26. Id. at *355-56.
27. 2d. ata *17-19.
28. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *256.
29. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at * 16.
30. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *233.
31. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *365.
32. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (Dover 1991) (1881).
33. See, e.g., MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39 (Charles
Gray ed., 1971) (declaring a century before Blackstone that laws are "accommodated to the
Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniences of the People ... as those Exigencies and Conveniences
do insensibly grow upon the People").
34. 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 278 (rev. ed.
1966) (1911). Dickinson added:
anticipated Holmes when he wrote in the Federalist Papers: "Is it not the
glory of the people of America, that... they have not suffered a blind
veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the
suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation,
and the lessons of their own experience?" 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in 1813:
When our ancestors emigrated from England, they took with them
such of the English principles as were convenient for the situation in
which they were about to place themselves. It required time and
experience to ascertain how much of the English law would be
suitable to this country. By degrees, as circumstances demanded,
we adopted the English usages, or substituted others better suited to
our wants, till at length, before the time of the revolution, we had
formed a system of our own .... 36
There could be no clearer statement that judges make law as well as find it
and that they take account of changing human circumstances and needs.
St. George Tucker offered a memorable evolutionary metaphor in his
1803 American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries.37  He wrote that a
community's law might begin as a seedling oak, advance with civilization,
and put forth "innumerable branches till it covers the earth with an extensive
shade. '38 Every year might be "the parent of new branches or the destroyer
of old ones."' 3 9 Nevertheless:
[A] superficial observation of [the] exterior... [will not] suffice; the
roots may be decayed, the trunk hollow, and the monarch of the
forest ready to fall with its own rottenness and weight, at the
It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English
Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could have discovered the odd &
in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury.
Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has given a sanction to
them.
Id.; see also Barwell v. Brooks, 99 Eng. Rep. 702, 703 (K.B. 1784) ("As the usages of society alter,
the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind.").
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 72 (James Madison) (Michael Lloyd Chadwick ed., 1987).
36. Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binney 554 (Pa. 1813).
37. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1996) (1803).
38. Id. at xv.
39. Id.
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moment that its enormous bulk, extensive branches, and luxuriant
foliage would seem to promise a millennial duration.4 °
Tucker recognized the need for constant growth, constant pruning, and
occasional uprooting in a forest of evolving law.
Oliver Wendell Holmes offered nothing new when he noted the adaptive
nature of law. The jurisprudential revolution that his generation
accomplished was swift and thorough, but it did not consist of recognizing
that law can respond to what Holmes called "the felt necessities of the
times.",4 1 It consisted of saying that there was no more to law than that. The
felt necessities of the times were all there was. The achievements of the
Holmesian revolution were negative. Holmes and his contemporaries did
not bring something bold, new, and sexy to law. They took something
away-the idea that, even as law adapts to changing circumstances, it can
adhere at its core to immutable principles of justice.42 The jurisprdential
revolution of the late nineteenth century was not a revolt against formalism.
It was a revolt against natural law.43
Holmes and his supposed nemesis Christopher Columbus Langdell
agreed far more than they differed,44 and what Robert Gordon wrote of
Langdell and his followers was equally true of Holmes:
[They] agreed that [legal] science should be a positive science based
on observable facts .... [T]his commitment expressed an attitude-
a "masculine" readiness to look brute reality unblinkingly in the
face, to throw off the crutches of religion, moral sentiment, and the
stale formulae of conventional professional wisdom, and to embark
upon the strenuous, tough-minded, intellectual path.4 5
Holmes made no bones about it. "I take no stock in abstract rights," he
said, and "equally fail to respect the passion for equality."4 6 He wrote to one
40. Id.
41. HOLMES, supra note 32, at 1.
42. See, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY
OF JUSTICE OLIVER HOLMES 1 (2000).
43. See id.
44. See id. at86-90,97-100.
45. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Education and Practice: The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1240 (1995).
46. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Aug. 1, 1925), in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at
769 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS]. Holmes also observed
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of his correspondents, "You respect the rights of man-I don't, except those
things a given crowd will fight for.",4 7 On another occasion, he observed,
"All my life I have sneered at the natural rights of man., 48
While a Justice of the Supreme Court, Holmes wrote an article on
natural law in the Harvard Law Review.4 9 Asserting that a right was natural
or innate, he said, was like insisting that one's lady was the fairest, rather
than simply a very nice girl.50 A right, in Holmes's view, was "only the
hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact
that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things said to
contravene it."51 Holmes earlier had observed, "[A]ll law means I will kill
you if necessary to make you conform to my requirements."52
Holmes's dismissal of natural law reflected his deep skepticism about most
things:
[M]y bet is that we have not the kind of cosmic importance that
the parsons and philosophers teach. I doubt if a shudder would go
through the spheres if the whole ant heap were kerosened.53
I see no reason for attributing to a man a significance different in
kind from that which belongs to a baboon or to a grain of sand.54
I wonder if cosmically an idea is any more important than the
bowels. 
5
I think that the sacredness of human life is a purely municipal
ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force,
that "the passion for equality ... seems to me merely idealizing envy." Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (May 12, 1927), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra, at 942.
47. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (June 1, 1927), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 46, at 948.
48. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in I HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 21.
49. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1918).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Sept. 7, 1916), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 46, at 16.
53. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 19, 1909), Introduction to
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES,
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. xxv-xxvi (Richard
A. Posner ed., 1992).
54. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in 2 THE
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 252 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.) (Harvard Univ. Press, 1941) [hereinafter
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS]; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Jan.
11, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 1125 ("1 regard [man] as I do the other
species ... having for his main business to live and propagate, and for his main interest food and
sex. A few get a little further along and get pleasure in it, but are fools if they are proud.").
55. See Harold R. McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36 A.B.A. J. 261, 264 (1950)(quoting a letter from Holmes to Pollock).
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mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima
ratio .... [E]very society rests on the death of men....56
Holmes had values, or at least he said he did. He called these values his
"can't helps":
As I probably have said many times before, all I mean by truth
is what I can't help believing-I don't know why I should assume
except for practical purposes of conduct that [my] can't help has
more cosmic worth than any others-I can't help preferring port to
ditch-water, but I see no ground for supposing that the cosmos
shares my weakness .... [I] demand... of my philosophy simply to
show that I am not a fool for putting my heart into my job.57
Holmes observed that "moral and aesthetic preferences" are "more or
less arbitrary .... Do you like sugar in your coffee or don't you?... So as to
truth."' 8 He said on another occasion, "Our tastes are finalities."59
And so, port over ditch-water and sweet coffee over bitter, Holmes had
his "can't helps," yet it was difficult to determine what they were.60
56. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 54, at 36. Holmes added, "I should be glad... if it could
be arranged that the death should precede life by provisions for a selected race, but we shall not live
to see that." 1d; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Jan. 14, 1920), in
I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 232 ("1 repeat my old aphorism that everything is
founded on the death of men-society, which only changes the modes of killing-romance, to
which ... generations, of dead, or the memorial tablets of a great war, are necessary.").
57. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to John Chipman Gray (Sept. 3, 1905), quoted in
SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 283 (1989).
58. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lady Pollock (Sept. 6, 1902), in I HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 54, at 105.
59. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Address of Chief Justice Holmes at the Dedication of the
Northwestern University Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 530 (Sheldon M. Novick ed. 1995) [hereinafter THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES].
60. See GARY J. AICHELE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JUDGE 93
(1989) (noting that "[n]o record remains to indicate any interest in politics, civic, or charitable
activities," that "there is no record that Holmes ever represented the oppressed or downtrodden of
Boston," and that "if [the members of his law firm] had a social conscience, their practice did not
reveal it"). Borrowing the sentiment from an acquaintance of Holmes, Edmund Wilson described
Holmes as "[h]aving rarely, so far as is known, given a penny to a cause or charity, indifferent to the
improvement of others while preoccupied with the improvement of himself." EDMUND WILSON,
PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 796 (1962).
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Blackstone contended that everyone had a right to life, including a right to
"a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life.",61 Holmes maintained:
As to the right of citizens to support and education I don't see it. It
may be a desirable ideal to aim at, but I see no right in my neighbor
to share my bread. I mean moral right of course-there is no
pretense of any other, except so far as he in combination has power
to take it.62
Although Holmes was committed to living passionately, he disparaged
most passionate commitments:
I never read a socialist yet from Karl Marx down... that I didn't
think talked drool.63
The notion that we can secure an economic paradise by changes
in property alone seems to me twaddle. 64
When [my law clerk] talks of more rational methods [of
resolving international disputes], I get the blood in my eye and say
that war is the ultimate rationality.65
[I]f you think that I am going to bother myself again before I die
about social improvement or read any of those stinking upward and
onwarders-you err. I mean to have some good out of being old.66
Holmes apparently could not envision any basis for political, social, or
personal action other than self-interest. He wrote, "[T]he condition of others
is primarily their business and certainly is beyond our power. Whence the
futility of the command to love one's brother as oneself., 67  He also
observed:
61. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at* 127.
62. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (July 23, 1925), in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 46, at 762.
63. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Aug. 6, 1917), in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 46, at 96. As Holmes put the matter on another occasion, "The notion that with
socialized property we should have women free and a piano for everybody seems to me an empty
humbug." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1915), reprinted
in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 59, at 443.
64. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Introduction to Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 59, at 450.
65. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 27, 1917), in HOLMES
AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 70 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L.
Compston eds., 1996) [hereinafler HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER].
66. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (June 1, 1922), in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 46, at 430.
67. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Dec. 19, 1910), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN 1903-1935,
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I don't see why we mightn't as well invert the Christian saying and
hate the sinner but not the sin. Hate... imports no judgment.
Disgust is ultimate and therefore as irrational as reason itself-a
dogmatic datum. The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as
me; but I kill it if I get a chance, as also mosquitos, cockroaches,
murderers, and flies. My only judgment is that they are
incongruous with the world I want; the kind of world we all try to
make according to our power.68
Holmes's "can't helps" did not include religious belief or even moral
principles:
I said to a lady at dinner the other night that morals were a
contrivance of man to take himself seriously, which means that the
philosophers.., make them an end in themselves, an absolute
matter, and so an excuse for their pretention to be on the ground
floor and personal friends of God.69
The first "unalienable" right articulated by the Declaration of
Independence was life, but the founders' self-evident truths were not among
Holmes's "can't helps." In 1929, Justice Holmes dissented from the
Supreme Court's ruling that Rosika Schwimmer, a well known pacifist,
could not be a citizen of the United States.7 ° Schwimmer had refused to
swear that she would bear arms in case of war. As a letter by Holmes
recounted her lawyer's argument, Schwimmer "wouldn't do what the law
wouldn't let her do."'" A federal statute demanded a pledge to "support and
at 59 (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964) [hereinafter THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS].
68. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (May 21, 1914), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 67, at 93.
69. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Alice Stopford Green (Feb. 7, 1909), quoted in
Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes's Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 703, 721 (1992).
70. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For brief
biographies of Schwimmer and her pioneering lawyer Olive Rabe, see Ronald K.L. Collins and
David L. Hudson, Jr., Remembering 2 Forgotten Women in Our Free Speech History, Part I (May
27, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id = 19957, and Ronald K.L. Collins
and David L. Hudson, Jr., To the High Court: Olive Rabe Representing Rosika Schwimmer, Part 2
(May 26, 2008), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.asp x ?id = 19995.
71. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 1146.
defend the Constitution... against all enemies, foreign and domestic," and
the majority read this statute to preclude Schwimmer's naturalization.72
Holmes's dissent spoke eloquently of "freedom for the thought we
hate."" Then, commenting on Schwimmer's pacifism in a letter, Holmes
revealed how much he did hate the thought: "What damned fools people are
who believe things .... All 'isms seem to me silly-but this hyperaethereal
respect for human life seems perhaps the silliest of all."74
Holmes had addressed the same subject in a letter to Dean Wigmore:
Doesn't this squashy sentimentality of a big minority of our people
about human life make you puke? [That minority includes] people
who believe there is an onward and upward-who talk of uplift-
who think that something in particular has happened and that the
universe is no longer predatory. Oh bring in a basin.75
Someone who adopts a skeptical posture may find it difficult to affirm a
belief in any cause. Confronting the plausible "sez whos" ' 7 6 of others
diminishes the ability to fire "sez whos" oneself, and Holmes eliminated the
obvious candidates from a list of "can't helps." Still, Holmes's list was not
empty. He stood squarely for the glory of struggle and war. "[W]hen men
differ in taste as to the kind of world they want the only thing to do is to go
to work killing," he said. 77 He wrote on another occasion, "[W]ar not only
is not absurd but is inevitable and rational. 78
And, oh yes, Holmes had one more cause or "can't help"-his "starting
point for an ideal for law":
I believe that the wholesale social regeneration which so many now
seem to expect, if it can be helped by conscious, co-ordinated
human effort, cannot be affected appreciably by tinkering with the
institution of property, but only by taking in hand life and trying to
72. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 646.
73. Id. at 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 1146.
75. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to John. H. Wigmore (Nov. 1915), quoted in Novick,
supra note 69, at 469 n. 11.
76. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230
(1979).
77. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Dec. 3, 1917), in I HOLMES-LASKI
LETrERS, supra note 46, at 116; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski(Aug. 5, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 862 ("Pleasures are ultimates and in
cases of difference between oneself and another there is nothing to do except in unimportant matters
to think ill of him and in important ones to kill him.").
78. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick and Lady Pollock (Sept. 20, 1928),
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 54, at 230.
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build a race. That would be my starting point for an ideal for the
law.79
Especially in light of later history, many of Holmes's statements about
race building seem chilling. He wrote of "substitut[ing] artificial selection
for natural by putting to death the inadequate" 80 and of his contempt for
"socialisms not prepared... to kill everyone below the standard.",81 Holmes
declared, "I can imagine a future in which science... shall have gained such
catholic acceptance that it shall take control of life, and condemn at once
with instant execution what now is left for nature to destroy., 82 He spoke of
the possibility of a future civilization "with smaller numbers, but perhaps
also bred to greatness and splendor by science.,
83
In a letter to Felix Frankfurter, Holmes expressed irritation with Francis
Philbrick, a reviewer of his Collected Legal Papers:
[Philbrick] says, "whatever that may mean" when I say that I don't
think you can do much by tinkering with property without taking in
hand life. I meant what I suppose he would think horrible-
restricting propagation by the undesirables and putting to death
infants that didn't pass the examination, etc. etc.
84
Holmes then grumbled, "I suspect that Mr. Philbrick believes in some
iM,85ism. , 8
In 1941, Father Francis E. Lucey noted one of Holmes's statements
concerning eugenics. Holmes had said, "I shall think socialism begins to be
entitled to serious treatment when and not before it takes life in hand and
79. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1915), reprinted in 3
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 59, at 443.
80. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Clare Fitzpatrick, Lady Castletown (Aug. 19,
1897), quoted in Novick, supra note 69, at 729.
81. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 6, 1917), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 67, at 145. Note that this statement followed the one cited in the
preceding footnote by twenty years.
82. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Soldier's Faith, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES, supra note 59, at 487.
83. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law and the Court, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES, supra note 59, at 505, 507.
84. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (Sept. 3, 1921), in HOLMES AND
FRANKFURTER, supra note 65, at 125.
85. Id. at 126.
prevents the continuance of the unfit."86 Lucey remarked that "[i]f recent
reports are true" the socialist state in Germany appeared to satisfy Holmes's
standard for serious treatment.87
Richard Posner has noted that "belief in human eugenics was a staple of
progressive thought in Holmes's lifetime." 88 He added that, although people
now consider Holmes's eugenic enthusiasms shocking, "with the renewed
interest.., in euthanasia, and with the rise of genetic engineering, we may
yet find those enthusiasms prescient rather than depraved." 89  Yet, as
Holmes biographer Sheldon Novick observed, Holmes's position went "well
beyond the conventional views on eugenics of his day." 90
Many Americans of Holmes's generation favored the forced sterilization
of "imbeciles." Indeed, thirty states ultimately enacted laws requiring it,9'
and Holmes's opinion for the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell92 upheld the
constitutionality of one of these laws. The opinion spoke of the danger of
"being swamped with incompetence" and proclaimed, "Three generations of
imbeciles are enough." 93
Holmes then reported to one of his correspondents, "I wrote and
delivered a decision upholding the constitutionality of a state law for
sterilizing imbeciles the other day-and felt that I was getting near to the
first principle of real reform."94  He wrote to another that it "gave me
pleasure, establishing the constitutionality of a law permitting the
sterilization of imbeciles." 95 After the decision in Buck v. Bell, more than
eighteen thousand Americans were sterilized. Few had been sterilized
earlier, for state courts generally had held forced sterilization
unconstitutional. 96 Support for the sterilization of people believed to have
genetically transmissible defects marked the outer limit of the eugenics
86. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to J.C.H. Wu (July 21, 1925), in JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NOTICES, UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 181 (Harry C.
Shriver ed., 1936).
87. Frances E. Lucey, Jurisprudence and the Future Social Order, 16 SOC. SCI. 211, 214-15
(1941).
88. POSNER, supra note 53, at xxix.
89. Id.
90. Novick, supra note 69, at 732.
91. See IAN DOWBIGGIN, KEEPING AMERICA SANE: PSYCHIATRY AND EUGENICS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA, 1880-1940, at 78 (1997).
92. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
93. Id. at 207. According to Saul Touster, Holmes' language "was already modified, at the
insistence of his brethren, from an even more brutal original draft." Saul Touster, Holmes a
Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673, 678 (1982).
94. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (May 12, 1927), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 46, at 942.
95. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (May 19, 1927), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 67, at 267.
96. See DOWBIGGIN, supra note 91, at 78.
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movement in America. No notable figure other than Holmes wrote
approvingly of killing "everyone below standard" and of "putting to death
infants that didn't pass the examination." Eugenics, moreover, was the only
progressive movement Holmes favored. 97
I offer three points in conclusion:
First, lawyers and law teachers should stop beating an imaginary
deductive-formalist bogeyman alleged to haunt all pre-twentieth century
law. He never existed. Apart from William Blackstone's embrace of natural
law, he looks very much like a modem lawyer. Neither Blackstone nor
anyone else has claimed the ability to deduce all law from the brow of Zeus.
Second, the jurisprudential revolution that began in the late nineteenth
century was a revolt against natural law, not a revolt against formalism.
Although the ethical skepticism that came to dominate American intellectual
life need not lead to positions like Holmes's on eugenics, the belief that
human beings devise their own values to serve their selfish interests makes
monstrous moves like Holmes's easier.
98
Third, it all happened for no good reason. Disillusionment after the
Civil War probably had something to do with it, 99 and a book published by
Charles Darwin in 1859 certainly had something to do with it.'00
Nevertheless, people like Holmes hardly ever offered argument or analysis
to support their skeptical stands. When Holmes said that he sneered at the
rights of man, he described both his method and his position. Skeptics are as
likely to rely on assertion as believers. A person's convictions concerning
the most important issues in life often seem to hang by a thread. They
appear to depend on the believer's or skeptic's mood or on his allocation of
the lawyer's burden of proof.
Holmes saw more clearly than many later skeptics the implications of
his position. He did not claim to believe in much. Unlike some of his heirs,
he had the courage of his nonconvictions. Blackstone, however, understood
the natural law foundation upon which genuine ethical conviction can rest.
97. See ALSCHULER, supra i.ote 42, at 29.
98. So does the view that values are merely the product of genetic mutations that furthered some
distant ancestors' reproductive success. Contra RICHARD DAwKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 1-2, 286
(2006) (asserting that "absolutism nearly always results from strong religious faith" and that a world
without religion would be a world without suicide bombers, 9/11, Crusades, witch-hunts, and the
persecution of Jews as "Christ killers").
99. See ALSCHULER, supra note 42, at 41-51.
100. See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859); see also ALSCHULER, supra note
42, at 49, 52-67, 86-87.
